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IS THE ROBERTS COURT REALLY A COURT?
Eric J. Segall*
INTRODUCTION
Judges at all levels of the state and federal judiciaries are
expected to resolve legal disputes by examining prior positive law,
such as text and precedent, and then providing transparent
explanations for their decisions. Of course, there are many situa-
tions in which the binding legal text is vague, and the applicable
law is unhelpful, incomplete, or even contradictory. In those cir-
cumstances, judges must, out of necessity, fill in the gaps of the
law or simply extend or narrow prior law as best they can.'
But even when prior law does not point to clear answers,
judges are under a general obligation to examine and interpret
that law in good faith to arrive at their decisions. Judges must
then explain those decisions honestly and transparently. In
numerous important constitutional law cases decided by the
Roberts Court, however, the Justices did not seem to grapple with
prior law in good faith nor provide the true basis for their deci-
sions. In light of these cases, whether the Roberts Court acts like
a court at all is a serious question.
This question, of course, could just as easily be asked of the
Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren Courts, as well as all of the other
previous Supreme Courts. A comparative analysis of the various
Supreme Courts' reliance on prior law is well beyond the scope of
this Article. The Roberts Court has, however, decided many
important cases that suggest the current Court does not take the
* © 2011, Eric J. Segall. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, Georgia State College
of Law. I would like to thank the participants of the Constitutional Law Discussion Forum
at the University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law for their helpful comments
and the Stetson Law Review for its support of the conference. Mostly, a big debt of grati-
tude to Russ Weaver, who as usual, but this time in the face of an ice storm, organized and
implemented a wonderful and intellectually stimulating constitutional workshop.
1. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 273-274 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1994)
(arguing that it is within the discretion of a judge to expand or constrict the law according
to legal principle).
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requirement of transparency seriously and does not believe that
prior positive law (such as precedent) places any real constraint
on Supreme Court decisionmaking. Regardless of whether prior
Courts can be accused of similar attitudes, the general indiffer-
ence of the Roberts Court to these rule-of-law values is troubling.
L PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION AND PRECEDENT
In Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I),2 while William Rehnquist
was still Chief Justice, the Supreme Court reviewed a Nebraska
law prohibiting so-called partial-birth abortions.? Both the media
and the courts use the term "partial-birth abortion" when refer-
ring to a medical procedure called "dilation and extraction"
(D&X), which is a relatively rare method of performing mostly
second-term abortions.' The D&X procedure involves the termina-
tion of a pregnancy by partially extracting a fetus from the uterus
and then collapsing its skull to remove its brain.' The fetus is
then removed in as intact a manner as possible.? The more com-
mon method of performing abortions after twenty weeks is the
standard "dilation and evacuation" (D&E), in which the doctor
dismembers the fetus and pulls out the parts.' The basic differ-
ence in the two procedures is that the D&X procedure removes
the fetus as whole as possible, whereas the doctor conducting a
standard or non-intact D&E removes the fetus part by part.
Some doctors and medical experts consider the standard D&E
method inferior because it can involve substantial blood loss and
may increase the risk of puncturing the cervix, which could
impair the woman's ability to have children in the future.' There
is substantial disagreement within the medical community
regarding the pros and cons of both procedures."o
2. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
3. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-328 (2003).
4. Am. Pregnancy Assn., Surgical Abortion Procedures, http://www
.americanpregnancy.org/unplannedpregnancy/surgicalabortions.html (updated Nov. 2006).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Julie Rovner, NPR, News, "Partial-Birth Abortion:" Separating Fact from Spin,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=5168163 (accessed Apr. 12, 2011).
10. See id. (detailing the medical and political controversy surrounding partial-birth
abortions).
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The Nebraska statute at issue in Carhart I prohibited any
partial-birth abortion" unless that procedure was necessary to
save the life of the mother.' 2 There was, however, no exception in
the law for the health of the mother. Violating the law was a fel-
ony and led to the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's
license.13 Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician, brought a lawsuit
claiming that the Nebraska statute violated the Constitution
because it placed an undue burden on his clinical practice and on
his female patients seeking abortions. 4
The Court struck down the law by a five-to-four vote. Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Stevens, Souter, and O'Connor, found the law unconstitutional for
two reasons.' First, to the extent that the law was vague and
barred not only the intact D&X procedure but also the much more
commonly used D&E method, it posed an undue burden on a
woman's right to an abortion.'" This broad provision violated the
test set forth in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey." Second, and more importantly for our purposes, the
Court also held the law unconstitutional because it contained no
exception for the health of the mother." Nebraska argued that
the intact D&X was never necessary for a mother's health because
the standard non-intact D&E could always be performed." The
Court rejected that position, stating that the medical evidence
was conflicting, and Nebraska bore a heavy burden in showing
that banning the D&X was never necessary for the health of the
mother-a burden it could not meet.20 Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy each separately dis-
sented,21 with Justice Kennedy arguing strenuously that the
majority had violated core principles of the Casey decision.22
11. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-326(9) (defining partial-birth abortion as "an abortion proce-
dure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living
unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery").
12. Id. at § 28-328(1).
13. Id. at § 28-328(2), (4).
14. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 922.
15. Id. at 930.
16. Id. at 938.
17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 930.
19. Id. at 931.
20. Id. at 930-938.
21. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 953-956 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
2011] 703
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The debate over partial-birth abortion was far from over.
Congress had tried to enact two laws prohibiting the procedure in
the 1990s, but both were vetoed by President Clinton.2 3 In 2003,
however, President George W. Bush signed a new federal partial-
birth abortion law prohibiting the procedure.2 4 Aware of the
Court's earlier decision overturning Nebraska's law partly on the
grounds that the law barred the standard D&E, Congress care-
fully wrote the statute to define the procedure that would be
illegal, so that only D&X was prohibited.2 5 Congress failed to
address, however, the Court's other concern in Carhart I-that
there was no exception for the health of the mother. At the time,
the Court had never approved an abortion statute that did not
include such an exception.
The federal partial-birth abortion law was immediately chal-
lenged in federal court, and not surprisingly, it was struck down
by several judges on the ground that it did not contain an excep-
tion for the health of the mother.26 When the federal law finally
came before the Supreme Court in 2007, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito had replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice O'Connor. With the substitution of Justice Alito for Justice
O'Connor, Justice Kennedy was able to turn his Carhart I dissent
into the law of the land.
In light of the Court's prior decision overturning Nebraska's
partial-birth abortion law, the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Car-
hart (Carhart 11)2' had three options available to it if the Court
was going to take prior positive law seriously and act like a court.
The Court could have (1) affirmed its previous decision and over-
turned the federal law; (2) reversed Carhart I and upheld the
at 956-979 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 980-1020 (Thomas, J., Rehn-
quist, CJ., Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 960-961 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
23. See Tamara F. Kushnir, Student Author, It's My Body, It's My Choice: The Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1117, 1149-1152 (2004) (describing
the House and Senate votes and President Clinton's subsequent vetoes); Rovner, supra n. 9(providing history about the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
25. Id.
26. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted a permanent
injunction to prohibit the statute's enforcement except when there was no dispute over the
fetus' viability. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1048 (2004). The Eighth Circuit
affirmed. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 413 F.3d 791 (2005).
27. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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federal law; or (3) explained why the law or facts at issue in Car-
hart II were constitutionally distinguishable from the law or facts
in Carhart I and affirm the federal law. The Court, however, did
not choose any of those options. Instead, it upheld the federal law,
even though it did not contain an exception for the health of the
mother, without overturning its previous decision, which came to
the opposite conclusion on the identical question.
Justice Kennedy's opinion said that the main issue in the
case was whether the federal partial-birth abortion law placed a
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions.2 9 He
first distinguished the federal law from the Nebraska statute
invalidated in Carhart I on the basis that the federal law very
clearly prohibited only the intact D&X procedure and not the
standard D&E procedure.30 He then turned to the plaintiffs' arg-
ument that sometimes it is better for women's health to use the
intact D&X procedure rather than the standard D&E, and there-
fore the lack of a health exception in the law made it
unconstitutional."' This was exactly the argument that the Court
accepted in Carhart I when it overturned Nebraska's partial-birth
abortion law. By the time Carhart I had reached the Supreme
Court, there had been extensive factual hearings on the question
of whether the intact D&X procedure could ever be necessary for
the health and safety of the mother.3 2 The strongest argument for
the necessity of the intact D&X procedure was that some women
are better off if the fetus is removed as whole as possible rather
than cutting it into pieces and removing the fetus' parts one by
one.33 Some doctors disputed this idea at trial in Carhart I. The
Court held in Carhart I, however, that such medical uncertainty
and debate required the health exception under a proper reading
of the Court's decision in Casey:
28. See id. at 132-133 (reevaluating the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act).
29. Id. at 156.
30. Id. at 148-150.
31. Id. at 161.
32. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1124-1126 (Neb. Dist. 1998) (dis-
cussing expert medical testimony presented at trial on the safety of various abortion
methods).
33. Id. at 1105 n. 10.
7052011]
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[Tihe division of medical opinion about the matter at most
means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk,
not its absence. That division here involves highly qualified
knowledgeable experts on both sides of the issue. Where a
significant body of medical opinion believes a procedure may
bring with it greater safety for some patients and explains
the medical reasons supporting that view, we cannot say
that the presence of a different view by itself proves the con-
trary. Rather, the uncertainty means a significant likelihood
that those who believe that [D&X] is a safer abortion method
in certain circumstances may turn out to be right. If so, then
the absence of a health exception will place women at an
unnecessary risk of tragic health consequences. If they are
wrong, the exception will simply turn out to have been unne-
cessary.
In sum, Nebraska has not convinced us that a health excep-
tion is "never necessary to preserve the health of women."
... Rather, a statute that altogether forbids D&X creates a
significant health risk. The statute consequently must con-
tain a health exception.... [Wihere substantial medical
authority supports the proposition that banning a particular
abortion procedure could endanger women's health, Casey
requires the statute to include a health exception when the
procedure is "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
... Requiring such an exception in this case is no departure
from Casey, but simply a straightforward application of its
holding. 34
When the Court returned to this issue in Carhart II, it came
to a completely different conclusion without explaining or even
hinting that it was overruling Carhart I. The Court framed the
issue as follows: "[W]hether the Act has the effect of imposing an
unconstitutional burden on the abortion right because it does not
allow use of the barred procedure where 'necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the . . . health of the
mother."'3 ' The Court conceded that the law would be unconstitu-
tional if it "subject[ed women] to significant health risks."" And
34. Carhart 1, 530 U.S. at 937-938 (emphasis added).
35. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 161 (citation omitted).
36. Id.
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the Court did not refute the factual determination that it pre-
viously made in Carhart I that "whether the Act creates
significant health risks for women has been a contested factual
question. The evidence presented in the trial courts and before
Congress demonstrates both sides have medical support for their
position[s]."" The Court then spent several paragraphs detailing
the factual arguments for both sides and concluding that the
presence of medical uncertainty does not require a health excep-
tion for women.18 The Court did not overturn Carhart I nor did it
explain why the Court's analysis there was incorrect or even
unpersuasive. The Court simply changed its mind."
Under Casey and Carhart I, if there was uncertainty about
the medical necessity of an abortion procedure, the tie would go to
preserving women's health and the statute would be unconstitu-
tional. Conversely, under Carhart II, when there is medical
uncertainty, the tie goes to those wishing to ban the procedure.40
This change did not occur because of a change in text, precedent,
history, or even an open acknowledgment of a legal mistake. It
came about because Justice Alito replaced Justice O'Connor on
the Court. Worse, the Court did not even admit it was changing
such a core legal principle. This is not judging according to the
rule of law but judging under the rule of which side currently has
five votes. Nor is it judging by taking precedent seriously and
wrestling with it in good faith. When the Court overturns a prior
case, it should be transparent about that decision. Reversing a
prior decision without discussion might be fine for an overtly
political institution charged with making "all things considered"
decisions without regard for prior decisions, but it is not appro-
priate for a Supreme "Court" charged with acting as a court of
law.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 164 (stating that "[mledical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of
legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts").
39. See id. at 165-67 (failing to provide a reasoned basis for a departure from the
Court's prior decision in Carhart I). The Court did leave open the possibility of an as
applied challenge to the federal law. Id. at 167-168. But the chance of finding a woman or
doctor who would challenge the ban at a time when an abortion procedure is imminent is
extremely unlikely.
40. See Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, Father Knows Best, http://www.slate.com/id/216451
2/
(Apr. 18, 2007) (describing Justice Kennedy's opinion as reversing precedent without
proper justification).
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. GUNS AND HISTORY
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."4' From 1788, when the Second
Amendment was ratified, until 2008, when the Supreme Court
decided the landmark case of District of Columbia v. Heller,4 2 the
Court had never ruled for a plaintiff asserting a Second Amend-
ment claim." Moreover, all lower federal courts during that same
220-year period assumed that the Second Amendment did not
apply to individuals asserting the right to own guns for self-
defense or hunting but merely protected the right of the people to
own guns so that state militias could be called into service." In
Heller, however, the Supreme Court held that a District of
Columbia law that prohibited the ownership of all handguns
violated the personal right to bear arms protected by the Second
Amendment.4 5 Although this was not the first time the Court had
created a brand new constitutional right, Heller is important
because the Court justified its decision almost entirely on origi-
nalist grounds. Controversial decisions such as Lochner v. New
York,46 Brown v. Board of Education,47 Griswold v. Connecticut,48
and Roe v. Wade4 9 were based on the Court's self-identification of
fundamental values balanced against competing state interests.
Although many disagree with some or all of those decisions, few
would argue that they lack transparency. Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court in Heller, on the other hand, raises significant
transparency issues.
41. U.S. Const. amend. II.
42. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
43. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence,
56 UCLA L. Rev. 1343, 1347 (2009) (stating, "there were virtually no relevant Supreme
Court precedents, and certainly none that could be considered dispositive"); see also United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (denying that the Second Amendment had been
violated in the absence of showing that the prohibited firearm affected a well-regulated
militia); but see McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (incorporat-
ing the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 676 n. 38 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
45. Id. at 635.
46. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion overturning the
District's ban on handguns. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy joined the majority opinion. The
most important issue the Heller Court decided was the relation-
ship between the opening words of the Second Amendment: "[a]
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State . . . ," and the closing words: "the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."" Justice Scalia said that
"[tihe Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its
prefatory clause and its operative clause. The former does not
limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose."5 1
Justice Scalia's use of the word "naturally" is astonishing given
that the Second Amendment is the only section of the Bill of
Rights that has both a prefatory and an operative clause.
The majority then spent about fifty pages discussing the pre-
and post-ratification history of the Second Amendment to support
the conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to own guns.52 Justice Scalia relied on pre- and post-
constitutional treatises and laws, state constitutions ratified both
before and after the Federal Constitution, letters from several of
the founding fathers, and caselaw dating from before and even
after the Civil War.5 3 It is difficult to read this lengthy ode to his-
tory without a high degree of skepticism that Justice Scalia was
trying to justify a conclusion that he and the rest of the
majority had already reached on other grounds. One legal scholar
who has studied the history of the Amendment has called Justice
Scalia's historical analysis "disingenuous and unprincipled," as
well as "objectively untenable."5 4 In addition, the same scholar
notes that conservative and well-respected Court of Appeals
Judges Richard Posner and Harvie Wilkinson have "savaged"
Justice Scalia's opinion as "results-oriented historical fiction.""
These experts believe that the Second Amendment was discussed
primarily in the context of the virtues of having an organized
50. U.S. Const. amend. II.
51. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
52. Id. at 579-628.
53. See id. at 581-627 (citing a variety of historical sources relating to the Second
Amendment).
54. William G. Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia's Per-
verse Sense of Originalism, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 349, 352 (2009).
55. Id.
7092011]
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militia and the dangers of having a standing and professional
army." They suggest that any notion that the Second Amend-
ment, as a historical matter, was intended to protect the right to
own guns for personal self-defense or recreational purposes is
fanciful.
My point is not that the holding in Heller-that the Second
Amendment protects an individual's right to own guns-is
incorrect. Any number of plausible methods of constitutional
interpretation could support the Court's conclusion. Rather, my
point is that the historical analysis, which comprises almost the
entire justification for the Court's decision, does not transparently
explain the Court's result. Moreover, the Court never explains
why it relied so much on history in this case, yet almost never
mentions original meaning in other major constitutional cases
decided by the same Justices. In overturning voluntary affirma-
tive action plans by elementary and secondary schools;"
overturning acts of Congress regulating campaign finance" and
regulating speech;" closing the courthouse doors to taxpayers
suing the White House for alleged Establishment Clause viola-
tions;1 as well as numerous other significant constitutional cases
decided over the last few years by the Roberts Court, the Justices
almost never referred to, much less relied exclusively upon, the
original meaning of the constitutional provision at issue. So why
was that meaning so important in Heller? Justice Scalia did not
even begin to provide an explanation.
The Supreme Court in Heller created a brand new constitu-
tional right, overturned several precedents, and invalidated an
important piece of social legislation based on an historical argu-
ment that was at best plausible and at worst totally frivolous. Yet
the Court's opinion reads as if its historical analysis clearly sup-
ported its legal conclusion. Moreover, the Court dropped this
56. Id.
57. See id. at 352-359 (expounding upon the historical record at the time the Second
Amendment was drafted that unequivocally reflected a military and collective purpose
rather than one protecting the right to own a firearm for purely private self-defense).
58. Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
59. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
60. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
61. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
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historical approach when it casually announced that, even though
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own guns,
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms. 62
Why not? Several times in the opinion, the Court analogized the
Second Amendment right to the right to free speech in the First
Amendment, though the latter cannot be so casually limited. The
Court did not even try to justify these conclusions, much less
engage in any historical analysis of their premises.
The Supreme Court of the United States is supposed to
answer constitutional questions by looking at prior positive law
and then transparently explaining how that law applies to a
particular legal controversy. The prior positive law may be consti-
tutional text, constitutional history and tradition, or prior cases.
The Supreme Court is not supposed to engage in an all-things-
considered, cost-benefit analysis of the validity of the law it is
reviewing. But in many prior important constitutional cases, such
as Roe, Brown, and Lawrence v. Texas,6 3 the Court did engage in
an all-things-considered analysis, but at least it did so openly and
transparently.6 4 In Heller, conversely, the Roberts Court reached
a decision at odds with all prior, relevant positive law but tried-
albeit unpersuasively-to justify its decision exclusively on that
prior law. This is not judging transparently according to the rule
of law. In fact, it is not judging at all; it is advocacy-and not very
good advocacy at that.
62. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625-627.
63. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
64. See e.g. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-493 (explaining that in addressing the constitu-
tionality of segregation in public schools, the Court "cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted .... [The Court] must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation").
2011]1 711
Stetson Law Review
III. CITIZENS UNITED AND SUPREME HUBRIS
Much has been written and will be written about the Court's
holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,"s
which held that corporations have the same free-speech rights to
influence political campaigns as individual citizens. The balanc-
ing of First Amendment rights with the desire to limit the
influence of corporate spending on state and federal elections is
difficult and complex. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the
result in Citizens United, what is clear is that the Court took a
tortured and inappropriate path to reach its decision.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Citizens United held
that Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA)" was facially unconstitutional because it violated the
First Amendment." This federal law made it illegal for corpora-
tions or labor unions to use general treasury funds to pay for
broadcast, cable, or satellite communications that urge the rele-
vant electorate to vote for or against a specific candidate within
thirty days of a primary, or within sixty days of a general federal
election." The communication at issue in Citizens United was a
movie (Hillary: The Movie) made by a nonprofit corporation por-
traying Hillary Clinton in an unfavorable light." Citizens United
wanted to make the movie available on video-on-demand, but out
of concern that doing so would violate BCRA, it filed for a prelim-
inary injunction, arguing both that BCRA was unconstitutional
and that, in any event, it did not apply to Hillary: The Movie as a
matter of statutory interpretation.
In the district court, Citizens United expressly waived its
claim that Section 203 of BCRA was facially unconstitutional,70
and in its jurisdictional statement to the Supreme Court, Citizens
United said that it was raising only an as-applied challenge to the
federal law." Not surprisingly, the lower court never reached the
merits of any facial challenge to Section 203, and the issue was
65. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
66. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (2002) (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
67. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
68. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)3)(A)(i)(II)(aa)-(bb) (2006).
69. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
70. Id. at 892.
71. Id. at 931-932 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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not part of the original case argued in the Supreme Court during
the 2008-2009 term. On the last day of that term, however, the
Court set the case for reargument, and it asked the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing the facial validity of Section 203
and whether the Court should overrule two prior cases upholding
the law7 2-Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce73 and
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.74 In other words, the
Court reached out to decide an important issue not raised by the
parties and not part of the record below. Moreover, in the second
paragraph of the Court's eventual opinion, it said the following:
"In this case we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect,
McConnell."5 In fact, it was the Justices themselves who asked
the parties to reconsider those cases, not the other way around.
As Justice Stevens quipped in dissent, "Essentially, five Justices
were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so
they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to
change the law."7 ' This desire to reach out and change pre-
existing law, even when the parties have not asked the Court to
do so, is not proper judicial behavior.
On the merits, the Court overruled Austin and parts of
McConnell without giving significant deference to the importance
of stare decisis. The Court's essential holding, that corporations
have the same First Amendment rights as individuals, is incon-
sistent with a twenty-year-old decision (Austin) that was
reaffirmed by the Court in 2003 (McConnell) and undercuts state
and federal laws that have been on the books for almost fifty
years." Justice Kennedy's discussion of precedent occupies about
seven paragraphs in a fifty-seven-page opinion and amounts to
little more than a discussion of why Austin was incorrectly
decided.7 ' As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent:
[I1f [the] principle [of stare decisis] is to do any meaningful
work in supporting the rule of law, it must at least demand a
72. Id. at 888 (majority).
73. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
74. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
75. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
76. Id. at 932 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 930 (listing six cases "blaze [d] through" by the majority).
78. Id. at 911-913 (majority).
2011] 713
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significant justification, beyond the preferences of five Jus-
tices, for overturning settled doctrine....
In the end, the Court's rejection of Austin and McConnell
comes down to nothing more than its disagreement with
their results. Virtually every one of its arguments was made
and rejected in those cases, and the majority opinion is
essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents. The
only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and
McConnell is the composition of this Court. Today's ruling
thus strikes at the vitals of stare decisis, "the means by
which we ensure that the law will not merely change errati-
cally, but will develop in a principled and intelligible
fashion" that "permits society to presume that bedrock prin-
ciples are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities
of individuals."79
The Court in Citizens United overturned two prior cases and
announced a new rule of law because Justice Alito replaced Jus-
tice O'Connor, and consequently there were five votes to hold that
the First Amendment requires corporations to have the same
First Amendment rights as individuals. Moreover, the Court
reached this result with virtually no discussion whatsoever about
whether this new rule was consistent with the original under-
standing of the First Amendment (even Justice Scalia's
concurrence on this point is more about the text than the history
of the Amendment)." In one case, Heller, the Roberts Court was
concerned almost exclusively with original understandings (even
as it got those understandings wrong), and in another case, Citi-
zens United, it barely referred to those understandings at all. In
neither case are we told why original understanding was either
very important or not important at all. This kind of decisionmak-
ing is not transparent, nor is it consistent with the idea that
judges are supposed to take prior positive law seriously. With five
votes, the Justices can distort history, consider it important or
not, rewrite or overturn prior cases, and even reach out to
decide issues not raised by any of the parties so that the Justices
79. Id. at 938, 941-942 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
80. Id. at 929 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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can pursue their own political agendas. None of this is appropri-
ate behavior for a court of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Carhart II, the Roberts Court implicitly overturned an
important decision without any discussion of stare decisis. In Hel-
ler, the Court created a brand new constitutional right, displacing
centuries of caselaw, based on a controversial (at best) historical
account that raised serious questions about how the Court actu-
ally reached its decision. And, in Citizens United, the Court
reached out to decide an important and settled issue of constitu-
tional law not raised by the parties, and it did so without any
meaningful discussion of history or stare decisis concerns. In all
three cases, the only persuasive descriptive account of why the
Court veered from prior positive law is that the people on the
Court changed (Justice Alito for Justice O'Connor). This is not
judging according to the Rule of Law but judging according to the
Rule of Five Justices, and it seriously calls into question whether
the Roberts "Court" is, in fact, a court at all.
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